A Country I Do Not Recognize: The Legal Assault on American Values (Hoover Institution Press Publication)
Robert H. Bork
During the past forty years, activists have repeatedly used the court system to accomplish substantive policy results that could not otherwise be obtained through the ordinary political processes of government, both in the United States and abroad. In five insightful essays, the contributors to this volume show how these legal decisions have undermined America's sovereignty and values. They reveal how international law challenges American beliefs and interests and exposes U.S. citizens to legal and economic risks, how the "right to privacy" poses a serious threat to constitutional self-government, how the Supreme Court's religion decisions have done serious damage to our religious freedom, and more.
predecessors, the Warren (1959–1969) and Burger (1969–1986) Courts, were in the service of liberal causes.70 This claim has been so confidently and frequently asserted as to become, at least in the liberal media, conventional wisdom, despite the fact that the Court’s rulings of unconstitutionality continue overwhelmingly to favor liberal causes. The public’s view of the Court necessarily comes mainly from the media, and the media’s view mainly from liberal academics. For a Court to be considered
exercised in the absence of a link to some traditional basis for jurisdiction” other than universal jurisdiction.7 At most, there was a largely nineteenth-century effort, principally by Great Britain but to a lesser extent by the United States, to use universal jurisdiction claims as a way of justifying claims to police the seas. As explained by Professor Rubin: It may be concluded that “universal jurisdiction” when extended beyond the bounds of jurisdiction to prescribe and applied to notions
throughout their legal education. The constitutional law casebooks have become for that reason corrupting influences. In the hands of the Court, radical individualism in moral matters amounts (almost) to nihilism. If each individual defines meaning for himself, that can only mean that there is no allowable community judgment about moral truth. That conclusion is qualified by the simultaneous insistence that there are some moral truths the Court, but not an atavistic citizenry, has access to.
variety of political offenses, but is not necessarily confined to political acts.” Brownlie, supra note 4, at 304. The “passive personality” principle permits a state to punish acts beyond its territory that harm its own nationals. Although there is more state practice supporting these forms of jurisdiction than universality, common law jurisdictions have been dubious of both, preferring the relative certainties of territorial jurisdiction. See generally, id. at 303–304. 30. Eichmann Case, supra
City of Boerne v. Flores, 33n73, 107 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 34n78 Civil Rights Act (1875), 25 Civil Rights Act (1964), xxiv, 25–26; opponents of, 42; Title IV, 45; Title VI, 41, 44, 46; Title VII, 46, 46n112 Civil War Amendments, 13 Clark, Tom, 94 Clark, Wesley, 172 Clinton, William Jefferson, 99, 123, 128–29, 136, 174; Supreme Court appointments of, 51 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 122 Cohen v. California, xxviii, 29n57 Cold War, 30, 113, 133 Collins v.